The following is an excerpt from the introduction
to Jon Margolis' book, "The Last Innocent Year: America in 1964
(The Beginning of the Sixties)":
There never was an innocent year.
...But there was a time when the delusion of innocence was easy to
believe, when the myth was at least as useful as it was deceiving. That
time ended when 1964 did.
If the delusion of innocence ended in 1964, something else began: the
Sixties. The calendar tells us decades begin when the next-to-last number
of the year changes. We know better. When Americans at century's end
hear that now-cliched term the Sixties, the hopeful and relatively placid
years of John Kennedy's campaign and presidency do not come to mind.
Their tumultuous aftermath does. If the tumult did not start in 1964,
it blossomed then...
From every perspective except the calendar's, 1964 started forty days
early, when John F. Kennedy was murdered in Dallas. The wonder is that
the belief in American innocence was not murdered that day, too. In
retrospect, perhaps it was, but because beliefs do not die as cleanly
as people do, their deaths can escape recognition. America spent the
months after John Kennedy's death in denial. A few clung to the idea
of an ersatz resurrection by hoping that Kennedy's successor would choose
Robert Kennedy as vice president. Almost everyone tried to tell him
or herself that the assassination, for all its horror, was an aberration,
that the country and its culture remained strong, healthy, and essentially
unchanged. They were wrong. On January 1, 1964, the dourest observer
of the passing scene could not foresee a country in which students would
rise up against their elders, city dwellers would set fire to their
neighborhoods, large numbers of privileged young people would openly
flout the law, and women would begin to wonder whether the male sex
was their oppressor. By year's end, the most optimistic observer of
the passing scene would have wondered about all that—if an optimistic
observer could be found. For 1964 was the first year since the end of
World War II, if not in the twentieth century, in which events challenged,
if they did not overwhelm, America's habitual optimism. Sure, there
had always been naysayers and grouches—from Thoreau to Mark Twain
to Ambrose Bierce—but these had been a minority even among the
intellectuals. The prevailing ethos had been that although there were
problems aplenty, they could all be solved thanks to democracy, freedom,
the market economy, and plain old American know-how. That ethos was
not destroyed in 1964, but it was shaken, and the shaking came from
the American people themselves, who rose up—not as one, but as
many diverse, disagreeing (and disagreeable) factions against the elites
who had been governing them. For the first time, some even wondered
whether America's problems should be solved. These uprisings destroyed
the consensus.